The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance by Karmel, Roberta S.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
Spring 2004
The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes
Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance
Roberta S. Karmel
Brooklyn Law School, roberta.karmel@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons,
Jurisdiction Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
33 Stetson L. Rev. 849 (2003-2004)
STETSON LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXXIII SPRING 2004 NUMBER 3
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE SYMPOSIUM
ARTICLES
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION GOES ABROAD TO REGULATE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Roberta S. Karmel"
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the federal securities laws generally have been con-
sidered full-disclosure statutes, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) has been inter-
ested in regulating the corporate governance of public corpora-
tions to the extent it has any authority to do so. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)1 established the SEC to
administer both the Exchange Act and the earlier Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act).2 At that time, responsibility for regulat-
* 0 2004, Roberta S. Karmel. All rights reserved. Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor,
Chairman of the Steering Committee, and a Co-Director of the Center for the Study of
International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former Commissioner of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Author thanks Dean Joan Wexler for a research stipend from Brooklyn Law
School for the preparation of this Article. Additionally, the research assistance of Brooklyn
Law School students Andrea Fort and John Ivascu is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm (2000).
2. Id. at § 77a-aa.
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ing internal corporate affairs was left generally to state corpora-
tion law, state blue sky statutes, and stock-exchange-listing re-
quirements.3 Further, the SEC did not attempt to regulate the
corporate governance of foreign4 corporations, even if issuers en-
tered the SEC reporting-and-disclosure system. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley)s markedly changed the
boundary between federal securities law and state corporation
law with regard to corporate governance, not only for United
States (U.S.) corporations, but also for foreign corporations.
In one of the SEC's first corporate governance cases, In re
Franchard Corp.,' the Commission took the view that the integ-
rity of management was always a material factor to investors.7
Nevertheless, although the SEC staff urged that Franchard Corp.
be used to define the duties of corporate directors, the Commis-
sion declined to do so, stating, "The [Securities] Act does not pur-
port... to define Iflederal standards of directors' responsibility in
the ordinary operations of business enterprises and nowhere em-
powers us to formulate administratively such regulatory stan-
dards."8
When federal courts recognized implied rights of action under
Sections 10(b)9 and 14(a)0 of the Exchange Act, other courts were
tempted to consider cases involving not only misrepresentation
but also equitable fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty under state
3. Spec. Stud. Group of the Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Secs., Special Study on Market
Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. Law. 1487, 1498-1499
(2002) [hereinafter Special Study Group].
4. This Article will use the term "foreign" issuer or corporation to denote a non-
governmental corporation that is neither organized under U.S. laws nor majority owned by
U.S. nationals. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2003) (defining the term "foreign private is-
suer").
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code).
6. 42 S.E.C. 163 (U.S. Secs. Exch. Commn. 1964).
7. Id. at 169-170.
8. Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
9. See Kardon v. Nati. Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (disregard-
ing the lack of an express provision for civil liability in Section 10 because, as a whole, the
Exchange Act implies civil liability). The Supreme Court did not specifically approve a
private right of action under Section 10(b) until 1971, in Superintendent of Insurance of
New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971).
10. The Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under Section 14(a) in J.l.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-431 (1964). Foreign issuers are not subject to these
proxy rules. See 17 C.F.R. at § 240.3a12-3(b) (providing that securities that a foreign pri-
vate issuer registered are exempt from Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
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law by corporate managers." This led one commentator to declare
that the federal securities laws had given rise to a federal corpo-
ration law.12 However, this observation proved premature.
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, ' the United States Su-
preme Court seized an opportunity to quash the development of a
judge-made federal law of corporate fiduciary duty under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. 4 Santa Fe Industries resulted from a
group of minority shareholders' efforts to contest the appraisal
value of their shares through allegations of unfairness and over-
reaching. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit took the view that Rule 10b-5 reached "breaches of fiduci-
ary duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any
charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure."' The Supreme
Court reversed and held that Section 10(b) cases require "decep-
tion, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure."17 In so doing, the Court
rejected the notion that the securities laws "federalize the sub-
stantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden." 8 However, Sarbanes-
Oxley did federalize certain portions of the law of corporations for
public companies, thus changing the divide between federal and
state law.
11. E.g. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Shell v. Hensley, 430
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
12. "[A] federal law of corporations now exists. But it has always existed-since the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933." Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law":
An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1179 (1965).
13. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
14. Id. at 477-480.
15. Id. at 466-467.
16. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462.
17. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476.
18. Id. at 479. It should be noted that, after Santa Fe Industries, some courts took the
view that a material nondisclosure of a breach of fiduciary duty that denied minority
shareholders an opportunity to seek relief in a state court created a Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claim. E.g. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that deceit
upon a company's minority shareholders and misrepresentation about a looming transac-
tion constitutes a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that the majority shareholder's failure to disclose material
facts justified a Rule 10b-5 action, when minority shareholders would have been able to
file a derivative suit in a state court to enjoin a minority shareholder's breach of fiduciary
duty).
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In another important precedent concerning the SEC's power
to regulate corporate governance, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, in Business Roundtable v.
SEC, 9 invalidated a voting-rights rule adopted by the SEC on the
ground that "the rule directly [controlled] the substantive alloca-
tion of powers among classes of shareholders," and therefore, "it
[was] in excess of the [SEC's] authority under [Section] 19 of the
[Exchange Act]."' The court found that the SEC regulation was a
"rule" under Sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act, meaning
that the SEC had the authority to approve or to disapprove a self-
regulatory organization (SRO) rule on this subject, but that the
SEC's own rule was not "'in furtherance of the purposes' of the
Exchange Act."2' The court's rationale was that, in the statute,
there was no indication that Congress intended to permit such a
broad federal preemption over corporate governance and share-
holder rights-matters traditionally left to state law.' The teach-
ing of the Business Roundtable decision is that "[tihe Exchange
Act does not enable the SEC to establish a comprehensive federal
corporate law through listing standards."2 Rather, the SEC's au-
thority over corporate-governance-listing standards "must be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis with respect to a specific purpose
of the Exchange Act."2' Because Sarbanes-Oxley greatly enlarged
the scope of the Exchange Act as to specific matters of corporate
governance, the SEC acquired greater freedom to utilize SRO-
listing standards to accomplish corporate governance reform. In
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has made ample use of
this new authority, raising the interesting question of how the
line between federal and state law with respect to a corporation's
internal affairs should now be drawn.
The SEC did not attempt to regulate the corporate govern-
ance of foreign issuers that entered the SEC disclosure system
before the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. Because the SEC was in-
hibited in its efforts to regulate the corporate governance of U.S.
corporations, it was an easy policy decision to refrain from inter-
19. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
20. Id. at 407.
21. Id. at 409-411 (quoting the statutory language of Section 19(c)).
22. Id. at 412.
23. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1525.
24. Id.
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fering with the internal affairs of foreign issuers. Nevertheless,
the Commission's general attitude toward foreign issuers has
changed over the years. Generally, the most common approaches
to regulating foreign issuers that sell securities to domestic inves-
tors are as follows: requiring them to comply with host-country
laws (national treatment);' creating special host-country rules for
them;26 developing harmonized international standards; 7 and ac-
cepting compliance with home-country standards (mutual recog-
nition).28 The U.S. has approached this problem through national
treatment, with some special rules to ameliorate the problems of
compliance for foreign issuers.'m The European Union (EU) has a
regime of mutual recognition, as do some other jurisdictions.0
While there is no international securities regulator with the abil-
ity to impose a disclosure or other regulatory regime on all issuers
worldwide, the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) has developed a template for basic disclosure stan-
dards, and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB)
is developing international accounting standards (IAS).31
From the 1930s until the late-1970s to early-1980s, the SEC
took an isolationist approach to problems posed by foreign issuers
and the sale of foreign issuers' securities to U.S. nationals.32 For
more than forty years after Congress passed the Securities Act,
the SEC staffs attitude was that, if a foreign issuer was going to
tap the U.S. capital markets, it should play by the SEC's rules."3
This attitude was manifested in policy initiatives, such as the Ca-
25. See Roel C. Campos, SEC Commr., Speech, Embracing International Business in
the Post-Enron Era (Brussels, Belgium, June 11, 2003) (available at http-l/www
.sec.govlnews/speech/spch06ll03rcc.htm) (discussing the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley
on foreign companies selling securities in the U.S., and stating that the Act will treat
American and foreign companies similarly).
26. Id. This, to some extent, has been the SEC's approach.
27. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievement of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Intl. L.J. 185, 191 (1990).
28. Id. at 191-192.
29. Id. at 228-229; see supra n. 25 (describing accommodations that the SEC gives to
foreign companies).
30. Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings:
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 Mich. J. Intl. L.
207, 255-261 (1999).
31. Marc I. Steinberg, International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative
Analysis 27-38 (Kluwer L. Intl. 1999).
32. Roberta Karmel, Remarks, Regulating Corporations: Who's Making the Rules?
(Apr. 5, 2003), in 97 Am. Socy. Intl. L. Procs. 269, 272 (2003).
33. Id. at 273.
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nadian foreign restricted list-later called the foreign restricted
list-to keep out unregistered foreign companies.' In addition,
the SEC made very aggressive claims of extraterritorial applica-
tion in a series of cases brought under the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act. 5 Because these were fraud cases,
some of which involved organizations that U.S. nationals di-
rected,36 the Commission did not give too much consideration as to
how this expansive extraterritorial application of the securities
laws would play out in foreign countries, or how legitimate for-
eign issuers would interpret the application.
34. Id.; see Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 198 F. Supp. 508 (D.D.C. 1961) (holding
that an SEC list of Canadian companies believed to be distributing securities in the U.S.
without registering under the Securities Act was not unconstitutional), affd, 309 F.2d 647
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
35. Karmel, supra n. 32, at 273. For examples of cases in which the SEC participated
as amicus curiae, consult Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A, 871 F.2d 252,
261-263 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Americans holding 2.5% of a British corporation was
enough for American antifraud laws to apply extraterritorially), modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d
Cir. 1989); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (providing that Ameri-
can investors holding .2% of a foreign investment trust is insufficient for subject-matter
jurisdiction); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that
a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Exchange Act violations if there are
substantial effects in the U.S., even though the transactions occurred outside of the U.S.).
See also SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (declaring that a defen-
dant can be subject to personal jurisdiction if he or she causes consequences in a state);
SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1087 (2d Cir. 1987) (involving the SEC's suit for violations of
antifraud provisions against non-American individuals and companies because of insider
trading that consisted of stock being bought on U.S. stock exchanges); SEC v. United Fin.
Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356-357 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the determination of ju-
risdiction should be based upon activities in the U.S. and their impact on American inves-
tors, not on the number of American investors compared with total sales). The SEC ac-
tively participated in the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (1965) to assure that its broad extraterritorial jurisdiction was not com-
promised. But see Daniel L. Goelzer et al., The Draft Revised Restatement: A Critique from
a Securities Regulation Perspective, 19 Intl. Law. 431, 471 (1985) (providing that the draft
Restatement would result in narrowing the limits of international law and limiting the
effects of U.S. securities laws on international business activities).
36. E.g. IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that there is subject-
matter jurisdiction when the securities involved in violations were from American compa-
nies and the transactions took place in the U.S.); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974, 979 (2d Cir. 1975) (involving the sale of securities from an international sales-and-
financial service organized in Canada, with its principal place of business in Switzerland,
yet distributions went to two American banking houses); Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016-1018
(holding that use of the U.S. to make fraudulent security devices for use abroad can be a
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp.
987, 994-995 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (providing that, when the true issuers of securities are
American individuals and companies and the Canadian company is simply a medium for
the issuance of securities, there is subject-matter jurisdiction).
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In 1979, this isolationist approach reached a high-water mark
when the SEC adopted a new form for foreign issuer disclosure37
and changed to an internationalist or comity approach for a vari-
ety of business and political reasons.3" One factor was the devel-
opment of the Euro securities market and the U.S. government's
appreciation that perhaps it was not good policy for the U.S. to
encourage a viable global market operating in London in competi-
tion with U.S. capital markets.39 Also, the privatization of for-
merly state-owned British enterprises involved offering securities
of United Kingdom (U.K.) companies in the U.S." This program's
involvement of a friendly sovereign government allowed the SEC
staff greater flexibility in processing foreign-issuer-disclosure
documents.4 ' Other factors that tilted the SEC in the direction of
internationalism were the beginning of an era of much greater
cooperation between the SEC and foreign regulators, the emer-
gence of a truly international regulatory body in the form of a
changed IOSCO, and foreign governments' interest in encourag-
ing better securities disclosure and regulatory systems.42
During a period of about twenty years in which the SEC
adopted an internationalist approach to securities regulation, the
SEC revised its forms for foreign issuer registration,43 and the
staff made a concerted effort to accommodate the needs and re-
quirements of foreign issuers that were listing or raising capital
in the U.S." The one place where a regulatory line was drawn
concerned the reconciliation of accounting statements to U.S.
37. See 17 C.F.R. at § 249.220f (describing the use of Form 20-F); infra nn. 44, 67
(discussing Form 20-F).
38. Infra nn. 39-42 (providing reasons for the change to an internationalist approach).
39. Rpt. of the Staff of the SEC to the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affairs &
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Internationalization of the Securities Markets II-
79-90, 111-29-33 (July 27, 1987).
40. For a discussion on U.K. privatization, consult Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal
Considerations Affecting Global Offerings of Shares in Foreign Companies, 17 Nw. J. Intl.
L. & Bus. 30, 105-108 (1996), and Charles S. Whitman III, Privatizations, in International
Securities Markets 1991 (PLI Handbook No. B4-6967, June 20-21, 1991).
41. Braverman, supra n. 40, 105-108.
42. See generally Steinberg, supra n. 31, at 27-28, 203-237 (discussing the SEC's
attempts to improve international cooperation and to ensure effective enforcement
abroad).
43. See 17 C.F.R. at § 249.220f (providing the SEC's revised Form 20-F).
44. Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the
Global Market, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 241, 254-255 (1997).
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generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP). 45 In addi-
tion, the SEC developed exemptions from its registration re-
quirements for foreign issuers."' One consequence of this change
in attitude and changes in the global markets was an increase in
foreign issuer registrations with the SEC and in U.S. stock-
exchange listings of foreign companies.47 Further, a foundation
was laid for an international securities regulatory regime.4
In 2002, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, which took a uni-
lateralist approach to foreign issuer registration and regulation.49
Whether that approach will persist or whether the SEC will re-
turn to a more internationalist approach to foreign issuer regula-
tion remains to be seen. However, the statutory provisions make
no real exceptions for foreign issuers and apply, on their face, to
foreign issuers that have securities registered with the SEC.' The
Act also includes intolerably short time frames for the passage of
implementing rules, which, remarkably, the SEC met."' When the
SEC passed these rules, it was in a very difficult position, led by
an unpopular chairman and under political attack from all quar-
ters in the aftermath of many serious financial scandals.52 This
made it extremely difficult for the SEC to accommodate foreign
issuers-or for that matter, U.S. issuers-that had serious prob-
lems or concerns with Sarbanes-Oxley. In the short term, this
45. Id.
46. Id. at 256-257.
47. Id. at 248-249. From 1985 to mid-1996, "the number of foreign reporting compa-
nies listed on U.S. securities exchanges [grew] ... from 189 to 808." Id. at 248. By the end
of 1999, there were 1,200 foreign companies reporting to the SEC under the Exchange Act.
International Accounting Standards Concept Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 8896, 8899 (Feb. 23,
2000).
48. Geiger, supra n. 44, at 250-257.
49. William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony, Implementation of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affairs, Sept. 9, 2003)
(available at http'J/www.sec.govhnews/testimony/090903tswhd.htm).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see generally Wishy-Washy: New Governance Rules from the SEC, Economist
60 (Feb. 1, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 6244820) (discussing the short time frame).
52. On the same day in October 2002, the Wall Street Journal and The New York
Times called for SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt's resignation. Cleaning Up Dodge, Wall St.
J. A14 (Oct. 10, 2002) (available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3408336); Revenge of the Accountants,
N.Y. Times A38 (Oct. 10, 2002) (available at LEXIS, News library, NYT file). Although the
Chairman resigned shortly thereafter, the SEC's political problems did not disappear. See
Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 1,
2002) (available at LEXIS, News library, NYT file) (discussing the SEC's struggle to main-
tain its job of protecting investors against abuses in the marketplace amid the growth of
business and increased stock ownership).
856 [Vol. XXXII
Corporate Governance
generated frustrated and angry reactions from European and
other commentators and appeared to cause a sharp decline in the
number of foreign listings. However, there was a worldwide reces-
sion in the year following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, so the
economy probably was also a factor in the decline of foreign list-
ings. Nevertheless, the unilateralism of Sarbanes-Oxley has cre-
ated a political obstacle to joint efforts by foreign regulators and
the SEC in adopting a common approach to corporate governance
problems. Although the EU has some reform ongoing with respect
to corporate governance, Sarbanes-Oxley has engendered hostility
toward the SEC in Europe and elsewhere.
Part II of this Article will briefly summarize the SEC's fluc-
tuating policies toward foreign issuers, and Part III will outline
the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that are of importance to foreign
issuers with respect to corporate-governance issues. In Part IV,
the Author will speculate about the implications of Sarbanes-
Oxley upon international corporate-governance standards.
II. SEC POLICIES TOWARD FOREIGN ISSUERS
The number of issuers and investors involved in international
securities activities increases every year, and a growing number
of companies raise capital or list their shares on foreign ex-
changes. As of December 31, 2002, there were 1,319 foreign issu-
ers registered and reporting with the SEC-451 of which were
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), and 263 of
which were listed on the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ)." Yet, this is not a new phe-
nomenon. The Mississippi Company, which a Scottish financier
formed in France in the early eighteenth century, sold stock to
investors all over Europe, inspiring the South Sea Bubble in Eng-
land.' Investors from many nations invested in the Universal
Company of the Maritime Suez Canal, which was formed in 1858
and built the Suez Canal.' During the 1920s, European and other
53. SEC, Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, http'J/www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/mternatl/companysummary
.htm (last modified June 6, 2003).
54. Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political
Roots, 1690-1860, at 42-43 (Cambridge U. Press 1998). South Sea Bubble was the name
given to a series of financial projects that originated with the incorporation of the South
Sea Company in 1711, and ended nine years later in disaster. Id.
55. Zachary Karabell, The Suez Canal: A Cut in the Dunes, Economist 82 (June 14,
2004] 857
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investors purchased securities in the U.S., and U.S. investors
purchased foreign securities.5 From 1920 to 1931, 1,758 foreign
capital issues-both governmental and private bonds-were
floated in the U.S.57 During the Depression, many of these bond
issues were in default.5
When Congress passed the Securities Act, it contemplated
the possibility that foreign issuers might make offerings in the
U.S. and provided a special disclosure regime for sovereign debt."
Further, the law's jurisdictional reach extended to interstate and
foreign commerce.' The SEC potentially could impose its disclo-
sure obligations on any foreign company that sold shares to U.S.
nationals.61 Similarly, the SEC could require any foreign issuer
with $10 million in assets and more than 500 shareholders
worldwide-300 of which are U.S. investors-to register its equity
securities pursuant to the Exchange Act and, thereafter, to make
annual and periodic reports with the SEC.' However, because
under U.S. law, corporate-governance regulation generally was
left to the states, this task similarly was left to the national law of
foreign issuers. Among other things, foreign issuers were exempt
from SEC proxy solicitation regulations and short-swing insider
transaction reporting requirements.' This led to the idea that the
SEC would not attempt to impose corporate-governance regula-
tions on foreign issuers.'
2003) (available at 2003 WL 58583674).
56. See Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Con-
gressional Silence, 28 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 677, 691--694 (1990) (discussing factors that
led U.S. investors to purchase foreign securities and foreign investors to purchase U.S.
Securities in the 1920s).
57. Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal 74 (Yale U. Press
1970).
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. at § 77aa.
60. Id. at § 77b(a)(7).
61. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, SA v. Banque Paribas London, 147
F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that the Securities Act applies when both the offer
and sale of a security are made in the U.S.); Consol. Gold Fields PLC, 871 F.2d at 261
(holding that the SEC could impose registration requirements on offers of unregistered
securities that affect the creation of a market for unregistered securities in the U.S.).
62. 15 U.S.C. at § 781.
63. 17 C.F.R. at § 240.3a12-3(b).
64. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 687, 706 (1999)
(explaining that, even though issuers are not subject to U.S. corporate law, they must still
enter into a listing requirement with NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ); James A. Fanto, The
Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corpo-
[Vol. XXXIII
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Nevertheless, the SEC insisted that foreign issuers, that de-
sired to raise capital in the U.S. or list on a U.S. exchange, enter
the SEC disclosure system." In the mid-1970s, the SEC requested
public comments on improving the disclosure requirements for
foreign issuers, noting that such registration forms "require[d]
substantially less information than [that] required of [U.S.] do-
mestic issuers."6 Despite strong negative comments, the SEC
proposed new Form 20-F as a combined registration and annual
reporting form, 67 asserting that objections from commenters "must
be weighed against the economic interests of the substantial ma-
jority of [those submitting] comments."' Although the SEC
adopted Form 20-F, it bowed to some of the foreign issuers' objec-
tions by deleting certain proposed disclosures relating to corpo-
rate governance. In particular, the SEC deleted provisions requir-
ing the disclosure of officers' and directors' business experience
and background and the identification of the three highest paid
officers and directors and the aggregate amount paid to them; it
also conditioned a material transactions disclosure to the re-
quirements of applicable foreign law."9
Although the SEC refused to accord foreign regulators mu-
tual recognition with respect to foreign-issuer-disclosure stan-
dards, with the exception of Canadian issuers,70 it developed spe-
cial registration-and-disclosure requirements for foreign issuers."
Additionally, following a policy of international cooperation and
comity during the 1980s and 1990s, the SEC fashioned special
exemptions for foreign issuers72 and amended its foreign-issuer-
disclosure forms to comply with disclosure standards endorsed by
rate Governance, 17 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 119, 125 (1996) (explaining that foreign compa-
nies provide much less corporate governance information than U.S. companies provide).
65. Coffee, supra n. 64, at 687.
66. Means of Improving Disclosure by Certain Foreign Private Issuers, 41 Fed. Reg.
55012, 55013 (Dec. 16, 1976).
67. 17 C.F.R. at § 249.220(f). This continues to be the primary reporting form for for-
eign issuers.
68. Foreign Private Issuers, 42 Fed. Reg. 58684, 58685 (Nov. 10, 1977).
69. Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, 44 Fed.
Reg. 70132, 70133 (Dec. 6, 1979).
70. 65 Fed. Reg. at 8904 n. 38.
71. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 54764,
54764 (Dec. 6, 1982).
72. For examples of special exemptions, consult 17 C.F.R. at §§ 230.144A; 230.901-
230.904; 240.12g3-2(b), and Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combina-
tions and Rights Offerings, 64 Fed. Reg. 61382 (Nov. 10, 1999).
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IOSCO.73 Further, prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
SEC had worked toward an international accounting regulatory
regime, pursuant to which foreign issuers might be able to file
documents with the SEC using IAS, rather than U.S. GAAP.74
Similarly, SROs permitted foreign issuers to obtain waivers from
many corporate-governance requirements, although some mini-
mal corporate-governance requirements, such as holding an an-
nual meeting and maintaining an audit committee, could not be
waived."5
With this background, foreign issuers were shocked to dis-
cover that various corporate-governance provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley would apply to them." They had become accustomed to a
regime in which the SEC and NYSE "assiduously avoided impos-
ing governance requirements on foreign issuers."77 Foreign issuers
viewed U.S. financial scandals and failures as the context for
Sarbanes-Oxley and argued that the SEC should not impose cor-
porate-governance regulations on corporations that function in
very different corporate finance systems and with very different
structures than U.S. corporations." However, Congress and the
SEC took a unilateralist approach to corporate-governance regu-
lation, retreating to the view that, if foreign issuers wish to tap
the U.S. capital markets, they need to play by U.S. rules.' De-
spite prior SEC reluctance to interfere in the corporate govern-
ance of foreign corporations, the automatic application of many
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions to all SEC registered companies made
the SEC unwilling to craft exemptions for foreign issuers.*
73. International Disclosure Standards, 64 Fed. Reg. 53900 (Oct. 5, 1999).
74. 65 Fed. Reg. at 8896.
75. NYSE, NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 103, 302, 307, http:#www.cm.nyse.com/
cpgdate/nlcs/lcm.nsf7LaunchFrames (accessed Oct. 15, 2003).
76. Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Executive Compensation Following the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2115, 2133 (2003).
77. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. L. Rev.
1757, 1824 (2002).
78. Lehman, supra n. 76, at 2132-2133.
79. Karmel, supra n. 32, at 273.
80. Lehman, supra n. 76, at 2132-2133.
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III. THE EFFECT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ON
FOREIGN ISSUERS
A. General Observations
Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in response to the bursting
of the stock-market bubble in the late-1990s and the uncovering
of widespread financial fraud at large public companies that had
been high fliers during the technology-stock boom.8 The demise of
Enron, Adelphia Communications, Qwest, Global Crossing,
WorldCom, and other companies resulted in enormous losses to
shareholders and employees of the affected companies, not only of
their jobs, but also of their pensions.82 Scandals involving some
foreign issuers were publicized also."' Without inquiring too
deeply into the reasons for the stock-market bubble and its col-
lapse, or why accounting irregularities at public companies had
become so pervasive, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley to restore
investor confidence." The Act was based primarily on recommen-
dations from the SEC, and in the process, the SEC acquired
power to regulate corporate governance at large public companies
and to regulate auditors and attorneys more pervasively than it
previously had.
Many of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions apply to companies
that are registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act;' there-
81. Id. at 2116-2117. "About 1,000 corporations ... had to restate earnings in the
... five years" prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene;
Bush Is Talking Tough on Corporate Ethics, But Where Is the Regulatory Bite? N.Y. Times
C2 (July 11, 2002) (available at LEXIS, News library, NYT file).
82. See John T. Bostelman, The Sarbanes-Oxley Deskbook § 2:1-2:2.3, 2:4.2-2:6 (PLI
2003) (describing the effects of the demise of various corporations); Susan J. Stabile, En-
ron, Global Crossing, and Beyond: Implications for Workers, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 815,
819-824 (2002) (discussing reasons why some employees may or may not choose to invest
in company stock).
83. See John Carreyrou & Mark Maremont, Lernout States It Had 'Errors' in Account-
ing, Wall St. J. Cl (Nov. 10, 2000) (available at 2000 WL-WLJ 26616332) (reporting that a
Belgian corporation would "restate its financial statements ... to make up for past ac-
counting 'errors and irregularities); Craig Karmin, Chill Seizes Foreign Markets after a
Brief Rally: March Gains Helped Recover Some of Quarter's Losses; Investors Turn Cau-
tious, Wall St. J. C12 (Apr. 1, 2003) (available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3963412) (reporting possi-
ble accounting scandals in Europe); Michael Schroeder & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Foreign
Firms Trading in U.S. Get a Warning on Deception, Wall St. J. A14 (Sept. 29, 2000) (avail-
able at 2000 WL-WSJ 26611436) (discussing a German corporation's deliberate misinter-
pretations to investors).
84. Lehman, supra n. 76, at 2117.
85. Such registration is pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. at § 781.
Once an issuer is so registered, it becomes subject to annual and periodical disclosure
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fore, on their face, these sections apply to foreign as well as U.S.
issuers. It has been argued that Congress enacted Sarbanes-
Oxley hastily, in response to financial scandals widely reported in
the press during an election year, and gave no consideration as to
whether it was appropriate to include foreign issuers in the statu-
tory framework." However, some small shifts in attitude at the
SEC and its constituents prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley point in the direction of unilateralism at the SEC, as well
as in Congress. The most recent SEC amendments to the Form
20-F filing requirements for foreign issuers made the disclosure
requirements more stringent. For example, disclosures about
management remuneration are more rigorous, 7 the SEC began
prosecuting foreign issuers for securities law disclosure viola-
tions,' and, in response to U.S. issuers' objections to proposals
that would allow foreign issuers to report financial results in IAS
rather than U.S. GAAP, the SEC has yet to allow foreign issuers
to report in IAS."9 In its policies toward foreign issuers, the SEC
requirements and other provisions of the Exchange Act. Foreign issuers may qualify for
the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption from registration by filing materials given to their home-
country regulator. 17 C.F.R. at § 240.12g3-2(b). Further, foreign issuers are not subject to
the SEC's proxy rules, an area in which the SEC attempted to impose corporate-
governance standards prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. See supra nn. 6-47 (pro-
viding a brief overview of the SEC's regulation of corporate governance).
86. Michael A. Perino, American Corporate Reform Abroad: Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Foreign Private Issuer, 4 Europ. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 213, 213-214 (2003).
87. 64 Fed. Reg. at 53900. Although these amendments were purportedly put into
place to conform SEC requirements to IOSCO's nonfinancial disclosure requirements, id.
at 53901, they imposed some new disclosure obligations on foreign issuers, including addi-
tional and more detailed information about the directors' and officers' compensation and
management's interest in certain transactions. Id. at 53917.
88. See SEC, The Commission Files Accounting Fraud Action against Lernout &
Hauspie Speech Products, httpJ/www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/r7782.htm (Oct. 10,
2002) (announcing a civil injunction action against a European corporation that engaged in
fraudulent behavior).
89. In its concept release on possible acceptance of IAS for SEC filings, the SEC seri-
ously questioned the infrastructure for the implementation of IAS reporting, as well as the
lack of international auditing standards. 65 Fed. Reg. at 8902. Further, some commenters
on this release complained of disadvantages to U.S. issuers. E.g. Comments from Frank
Fernandez, Sr. V.P., Secs. Indus. Assn., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec., SEC, File No. S7-04-
00-International Accounting Standards (May 23, 2000) (available at http'J/www.sec.gov/
ruleslconcept/s70400/fernandl.htm) (discussing the risk to American investors involved in
adopting IAS); Comments from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec.,
SEC (May 23, 2000) (available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/conceptts7O400/pricewal.htm)
(describing the disadvantages associated with permitting two different accounting stan-
dards). Also, the SEC has refused to allow foreign exchanges direct access to U.S. investors
in the U.S., because foreign issuers that do not comply with SEC disclosure and accounting
standards could then be traded without SEC registration. Regulation of Exchanges, 62
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has long been caught between trying to accommodate foreign is-
suers to encourage them to enter the SEC disclosure system and
list on U.S. exchanges, and trying not to be so accommodating
that the SEC's policies with respect to U.S. issuers are under-
mined.' However, after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC
became more interested in enforcing its new authority over corpo-
rate-governance regulation for U.S. issuers, rather than accom-
modating foreign issuers.
Because Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementing regulations
are exceedingly complex and prolix, this Article will not attempt
to discuss every provision of the statute, but it will highlight
those provisions that have particular impact upon the federaliza-
tion of corporate governance, federalization of the regulation of
corporate advisors, and corporate governance implications of this
federalization for foreign issuers.
B. Certifications
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring the
principal executive and financial officers of SEC-registered issu-
ers to certify annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC."'
The signing officer or officers must certify the following: he or she
"has reviewed the report"; "the report does not contain any untrue
[or misleading] statement[s]"; in all material respects, the report
"fairly present[s) ... the financial condition and results of opera-
tions of the issuer"; and the signing officers "are responsible for
establishing and maintaining internal controls," and "have de-
signed such internal controls to ensure that material information
.. is made known to such officers" and others, and "have evalu-
ated the effectiveness of [such] controls."' Further, there are
criminal penalties for providing false certifications. 93
Although foreign issuers complained that imposing a certifi-
cation requirement on their executives was inconsistent with the
Fed. Reg. 30485, 30529 (June 4, 1997).
90. Id.
91. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 302, 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 777.
92. Id. Rules 13a-14 and 13a-15 have implemented these provisions. 17 C.F.R. at
§ 240.13a-14-240.13a-15; Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57276, 57277 (Sept. 9, 2002).
93. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 906, 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 806 (amending 18 U.S.C. ch.
63).
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SEC's historical treatment of foreign corporations," the SEC ap-
plied the certification requirement to all registered and reporting
companies."5 This application created some conflicts with foreign
law. In some jurisdictions, only the person actually responsible for
a violation or omission may be held legally responsible;6 in other
jurisdictions, the entire board is responsible for financial state-
ments published. 7 There were also requests that issuers be able
to use local formulations of the term "fairly presents" as the ac-
ceptable certification standard." The differences between the U.S.
"fairly presents" standard and a "true and fair" standard, which is
used in the U.K., other European countries, and Japan, are both
subtle and profound." In the U.S. and U.K., accounting certifica-
tions are based on professional accounting standards involving
professional judgments."° In other countries, they are based on
legal requirements. °" Further, the "true and fair" standard varies
94. E.g. Comments from Dr. Arnold Knechtle, Dir., Fedn. of Swiss Indus. Holding
Cos., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec., SEC, File No. S7-21-02--Certification of Disclosure in
Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports (Aug. 19, 2002) (available at httpJ/
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/aknechtlel.htm) (commenting on the SEC's historical
practice of avoiding undue burdens on foreign issuers); Comments from Ian Mullen, C.
Exec., British Bankers Assn., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec., SEC, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002:
SEC Consultation on Certification of Disclosures and Other Issues (Aug. 23, 2002) (avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/imullenl.htm) (describing the SEC's
historical willingness to allow foreign registrants to implement local corporate-governance
standards); see also Charles Goldsmith et al., A Global Journal Report: Europe's CEOs Bite
Sarbanes Bullet; New Corporate-Reform Law Vexes Some EU Companies, But They Want
U.S. Listing, Wall St. J. All (Aug. 22, 2002) (available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3404183) (report-
ing on European businesses' criticism of the rules).
95. 67 Fed. Reg. at 577277.
96. Comments from Dr. Arnold Knechtle, supra n. 94.
97. See Comments from Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen., EC, to Jonathan Katz, Sec.,
SEC, Proposed Rule: Disclosure under Sections 404, 406 and 407 (Nov. 29, 2002) (available
at http'Y/www.sec.gov/ruleatproposed/s74002/aschaubl.htm) (discussing the lack of clarity
in applying these audit-committee provisions to the single- and dual-board systems in
Europe).
98. See Comments from Linklaters, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec., SEC, File No. S7-21-
02-Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Release No.
34-46300 (Aug. 19, 2003) (available at http/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/
linklatersl.htm) (encouraging the SEC to allow local accounting standards for foreign
issuers). The comment also stated that some jurisdictions apply a "true and fair view,'
while others apply a "present fairly in all material respects" standard. Id.; see Matthew M.
Benov, Student Author, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating For-
eign Private Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 Transnatl. Law. 439,
449 (2003) (providing that some foreign issuers view "fairly presents' as problematic).
99. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the
True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. Intl. L. & Com. Reg. 893, 902 (2003).
100. Id. at 902-903.
101. Id. at 898-899.
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from country to country.'" Although the SEC did not accept the
requests for local formulations of "fairly presents," it clarified that
certification is not an attestation that the financial statements
accord with GAAP, but rather a broader requirement of "overall
material accuracy and completeness.""3
A related problem for foreign issuers was the limitation on
the use of non-U.S. GAAP financial information in registration
statements and periodic reports filed on Form 20-F. Sarbanes-
Oxley directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring non-GAAP finan-
cial measurements to be "reconcile[d] ... with the financial condi-
tion and results of operations ... under [GAAP]" and that any
public disclosure or release of "pro forma financial information"
not be false or misleading." While this provision was aimed at
abuses in earnings announcements by U.S. companies,"' it had a
serious impact on foreign issuers. In the regulation that the SEC
adopted to implement this provision," foreign issuers are not re-
quired to reconcile a non-GAAP financial measure to GAAP if the
company's securities are "listed ... outside the [U.S.]," "[tihe non-
GAAP financial measure is not derived from or based on a [finan-
cial] measure calculated and presented in accordance with [U.S.
GAAP]," and "[t]he disclosure is made.., outside the [U.S.]"1 7
C. Internal Controls and Whistleblowers
Another troublesome disclosure that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes
upon foreign issuers requires companies to include an explanation
of their internal controls in their annual reports." Under the
SEC's final rules, an issuer's annual report must include the fol-
lowing: "[a] statement of [the] management's responsibility [over]
... internal control[s]" and procedures for financial reporting; a
statement of the framework used to evaluate "the effectiveness of
the company's internal control[s] over financial reporting";
"[mianagement's assessment of the effectiveness" of these inter-
102. Id. at 902-904.
103. 67 Fed. Reg. at 57279.
104. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 401(b), 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 786.
105. Cautionary Advice Regarding the Use of "Pro Forma" Financial Information in
Earnings Releases, 66 Fed. Reg. 63731, 63732 (Dec. 10, 2001).
106. 17 C.F.R. at §§ 244.100-244.102.
107. Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820, 4821
(Jan. 30, 2003).
108. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 404, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 789.
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nal controls over the past year, identifying "any material weak-
nesses"; and a statement that the issuer's auditors attested to the
management's assessment of internal controls.0 9 The only relief
given to foreign issuers in the SEC's adopting rules was a delayed
date for compliance."0
In a later interpretive release on the use of non-GAAP finan-
cial measures, the SEC reiterated that, in its filings, a foreign
issuer may include a non-GAAP financial measure that otherwise
would be prohibited if, among other things, the non-GAAP finan-
cial measure is "required or expressly permitted by the standard-
setter that establishes the [GAAP] used in the [company's] pri-
mary financial statements.""' According to the staff, "expressly
permitted" means that the measure is clearly and specifically
identified as an acceptable measure by the responsible standard
setter.
1 2
The whistleblower-protection provisions are contained in
three separate sections of Sarbanes-Oxley. A new civil cause of
action was established that protects employees of publicly traded
companies who lawfully "provide [evidence] ... or otherwise as-
sist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee
reasonably believes constitutes a violation" of the federal mail,
wire, bank, or securities fraud statutes, any SEC rule or regula-
tion, "or any provision of [flederal law relating to fraud against
shareholders."' Another provision established criminal liability
for whistleblower retaliation."" Finally, audit committees of pub-
lic companies are required to "establish procedures for ... the
receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints" the company re-
ceives "regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or au-
diting matters," and certain confidential, anonymous employee
submissions concerning "questionable accounting or auditing
matters."' 5
109. Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certifica-
tion of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, 36642 (June 18,
2003).
110. Id. at 36647-36648.
111. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4824.
112. Id.
113. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 806, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 803 (amending 18 U.S.C. ch.
73).
114. See id. at § 1107, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 810 (subjecting one to a fine and/or impris-
onment of not more than ten years).
115. Id. at § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 776 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f).
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These provisions represent the federalization of state-law
statutes protecting whistleblowers."' In addition, the SEC's rules
regarding "up the ladder" reporting by attorneys is a further fed-
eralization of whistleblower protection." 7 However, the whistle-
blowing provisions are not limited to U.S. public corporations; the
criminal provision states that the provisions should be applied
extraterritorially."5
D. Executive Compensation and Loans
During the 1990s, executive compensation reached exorbitant
levels, and a number of abusive practices came to light when the
stock-market bubble burst. Although Congress did not try to limit
executive compensation directly, four Sarbanes-Oxley provisions
were directed at specific management compensation abuses.
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under
the securities laws, the [CEO] and [CFO] ... shall reimburse
the issuer for... any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-
based compensation... [and] any profits realized from the sale
of securities of the issuer during [the twelve-month] period
following the publication of the financial statement required to be
restated.'19 To give some teeth to this provision, the SEC was
given the authority to freeze assets to prevent an issuer from pay-
ing bonuses to executives in cases involving financial fraud."2 In
addition, directors and executive officers of issuers are prohibited
from trading in any of the issuer's equity securities during any
blackout period when employees are prohibited from trading.2'
These provisions were relatively noncontroversial and were in
response to some well-publicized abuses at Enron and other com-
panies that failed prior to the time Congress enacted Sarbanes-
116. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Whistleblower Protection under the Sar-
banes-Oxtey Act, N.Y. L.J. 5, 5, 34 (June 26, 2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley provides for
corporate whistleblowers by allowing both civil causes of action and criminal prosecution
for retaliation against whistleblowers).
117. See infra nn. 196-215 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of attorneys).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (2000).
119. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 304, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 778.
120. Id. at § 1103(aX3XAXi), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)).
121. Id. at § 306(a)(1), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 779.
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Oxley.'" Another Sarbanes-Oxley provision affecting management
compensation, which prohibits companies from extending, main-
taining, or arranging for the extension of credit to any director or
CEO of any public company,'" proved very disruptive to standard
arrangements at many corporations. Questions concerning in-
demnification advances, travel advances, personal use of company
cars, split-dollar life insurance, and cashless option exercises have
been so pervasive that twenty-five major law firms released a
joint outline describing their views on interpretive issues with
respect to the prohibition against loans to CEOs.1"
Since the statute does not contain exemptions for foreign ex-
ecutives and does not require the SEC to pass implementing
rules, the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions regarding the forfeiture of
bonuses and the prohibition against loans to executives are appli-
cable to foreign issuers in the SEC disclosure system."m Further-
more, certain exceptions in the statute for home loans, consumer
loans, and credit and margin loans made by banks and financial
institutions to their executives do not deal with foreign financial
institutions. This unequal treatment has given rise to serious
criticism. 26 However, the SEC rule prohibiting directors and ex-
122. See Lehman, supra n. 76, at 2115-2117 (explaining that Congress passed Sar-
banes-Oxley to provide relief due to scandals taking place in the corporate arena, and
noting that the Act now hinders several forms of executive compensation). The loans made
to executives of Tyco International Ltd., which were exposed shortly before Sarbanes-
Oxley was signed, were particularly egregious. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Susan Saulny,
Former Tyco Chief Faces New Charges, N.Y. Times C1 (June 27, 2002) (available at
LEXIS, News library, NYT file) (describing the indictment of Tyco's former Chairman and
CEO on charges that he engaged in fraudulent activity when he used company funds and
loans for personal use).
123. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 402(aXkXl), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 787 (amending 15
U.S.C. § 78m).
124. See Bostelman, supra n. 82, at § 13:2.1-13:2.6.
125. Lehman, supra n. 76, at 2133-2134.
126. See Comments from Ian Mullen, C. Exec., British Bankers Assn., to Jonathan
Katz, Sec., SEC, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002: SEC Consultation on Certification of Disclo-
sures and Other Issues (Aug. 23, 2002) (available at http/www.sec.gov/rulestproposed/
s72102/imullenl.htm) (highlighting the difficulties that Sections 301, 401, and 402 of Sar-
banes-Oxley impose upon foreign issuers, and suggesting that foreign issuers should be
exempt from certain requirements contained in those sections); Comments from Sullivan &
Cromwell, to Giovanni P. Prezioso, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Conflicts with Foreign Law under
Section 301 and Other Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Oct. 11, 2002) (avail-
able at http-J/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/sullivanukl.htm) (discussing the firm's
criticism of Section 301 and certain home-country legal requirements, and describing the
firm's suggestions of how to remedy such conflicts).
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ecutive officers from trading during pension plan blackout periods
does contain an exemption for foreign executives.'27
E. Codes of Ethics
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to issue rules requiring is-
suers to disclose whether they have codes of ethics applicable to
senior financial officers.'28 The SEC rules implementing this pro-
vision require issuers to disclose, in their annual reports, whether
a code of ethics has been adopted and, if the issuer has adopted a
code of ethics, to file it with the SEC." Although the SEC made
these rules applicable to foreign issuers, they only need to make
the required disclosures annually.30
The SEC rules specify neither the exact details nor any spe-
cific language that must be included in a code of ethics, but SRO
proposed rules have included some of the matters that should be
touched upon.'' The open-ended nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley
provision and SEC rules give considerable scope to the SEC to
insert its views concerning corporate governance into the work-
ings of public corporations, either through future enforcement
actions or otherwise.
The provision with respect to codes of ethics is similar to the
European method of regulating corporate governance through
codes and then compelling issuers to disclose whether they com-
ply with code recommendations, and if not, why not.'32 Despite
this similarity, Europeans objected to becoming subject to the
127. 17 C.F.R. at pt. 245. In general, under Regulation Blackout Trading Restriction, a
blackout period occurs if there is a three or more day period during which there is a sus-
pension of trading in a covered individual account that affects fifty percent or more of the
participants or beneficiaries located in the U.S. Id. at § 245.100(bXl). For foreign issuers,
even if this fifty-percent test is met, if the number of affected participants that the issuer
covers in the U.S. is less than fifteen percent of the worldwide number of the issuer's em-
ployees, the regulation is inapplicable. Id. at § 245.100(bX2Xii).
128. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 406(a), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 789.
129. 17 C.F.R. at § 229.406; see Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (stating that the SEC
requires companies to disclose "whether it has at least one 'audit committee financial
expert" and any "amendments to, and waivers from," any relevant code of ethics require-
ment).
130. 17 C.F.R. at § 229.406(cX3).
131. Infra nn. 216-226 and accompanying text (discussing SRO proposals).
132. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1548-1549.
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Sarbanes-Oxley provisions regarding codes of ethics.1" Neverthe-
less, the SEC imposed such a requirement on foreign issuers.' 3'
F. Audit Committees
The SEC began advocating audit committees comprised of in-
dependent directors as early as 194 1,13 but took no action to im-
plement this idea until the mid-1970s.'" It then brought several
enforcement cases in which there were consent injunctions order-
ing a board restructuring so that there would be an audit commit-
tee that had a majority of unaffiliated or independent directors.
37
In addition, the SEC used its leverage with the NYSE and other
SROs to persuade them to make having an audit committee with
a majority of independent directors a condition of listing on an
exchange."3 However, the definition of "independence" in the
NYSE's rule was not stringent.
39
133. See Comments from Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen., EC, to Jonathan Katz, Sec.,
SEC, Proposed Rule: Disclosure under Sections 404, 406 and 407 (Nov. 29, 2002) (available
at httpA/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/aschaubl.htm) (describing the EC's concerns
regarding disclosure requirements and the negative effect that such requirements will
have on foreign companies).
134. 17 C.F.R. at § 229.406.
135. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1506; see In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc.;
Summary of Findings and Conclusions, 11 Fed. Reg. 10918, 10918-10919 (Sept. 27, 1946)
(holding that it would be in the investors' best interests to elect current-year auditors and
to establish a committee to nominate auditors to report on the company's status).
136. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1506.
137. See e.g. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 555 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) It 94,807, 96,693 (D.D.C.
Oct. 1, 1974) (requiring a corporation to establish an audit committee made up of no fewer
than three independent directors to review the financial records); SEC v. Killearn Props.,
Inc., 731 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,256, 92,693-92,695 (N.D. Fla. May 1977) (requir-
ing a company to maintain an audit committee of outside directors that would review the
financial records).
138. See In re NYSE, Inc., Exch. Act Release 13346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (Mar. 9, 1977)
(noting that the proposed rule would require listed companies to establish and maintain
audit committees composed of independent directors); ALI, Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3.05 cmt. a (1994) (noting that the NYSE re-
quires listed companies to establish and maintain audit committees made up of independ-
ent directors).
139. The NYSE listing rules required all "listed [domestic] companies to establish and
maintain an audit committee 'comprised solely of directors independent of management
and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its Board of Directors, would inter-
fere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member." ALI, supra n.
138. Other formulations similarly allowed directors to exercise their business judgment to
determine questions of independence. E.g. ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994
Edition, 49 Bus. Law. 1243, 1257-1258, 1264 (1994) (noting that independent directors,
when serving on an audit committee, should exercise their independent judgment).
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In September 1998, the heads of the NYSE and National As-
sociation of Security Dealers, Inc., (NASD) appointed a Blue Rib-
bon Committee, at the behest of the SEC Chairman, to inquire
into the adequacy of the audit-oversight process by independent
directors. 140 The Committee issued a report recommending that
"the NYSE and the NASD require that listed companies with a
market capitalization above $200 million ... have an audit com-
mittee composed solely of independent directors."14' The Commit-
tee also recommended a requirement of financial literacy for audit
committee members. 42 In lieu of the SEC's rule proposals, the
SROs filed proposals for amended listing standards.43 Then, after
the collapse of Enron in February 2002, the SEC asked the SROs
to further review their listing requirements "with the goal of en-
140. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1509.
141. Blue Ribbon Comm., Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 11, http'J/www.nyse.com/
pdftlblueribb.pdf (1999). The Committee recommended that audit committee members
should "be considered independent if they have no relationship to the corporation that may
interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the corporation."
Id. at 10. The following are examples of questionable relationships:
" a director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the cur-
rent year or any of the past five years;
" a director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its affiliates
other than compensation for board service or benefits under a tax-qualified re-
tirement plan;
* a director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or
has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its
affiliates as an executive officer;
* a director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer
of, any for-profit business organization to which the corporation made, or from
which the corporation received, payments that are or have been significant to the
corporation or business organization in any of the past five years; [and)
" a director being employed as an executive of another company where any of the
corporation's executives serves on that company's compensation committee.
Id. at 10-11. A "significant" transaction is $200,000 over a two-year period. ALI, supra n.
138, at § 1.34(aX4).
142. Blue Ribbon Comm., supra n. 141, at 25-26.
143. See SEC, SRO Rulemaking, AMEX Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements, http'I/www.sec
.gov/rules/sro/am9938n.htm (Oct. 6, 1999) (describing the proposed rule change concerning
independent directors and audit committees); SEC, SRO Rulemaking, NASD Rulemaking:
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Nasdaq's Audit Committee Require-
ments, http'/www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nd9948n.htm (Oct. 6, 1999) (describing the proposed
rule change concerning qualification requirements and design criteria); SEC, SRO Rule-
making, NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit
Committee Requirements of Listed Companies, httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9939n.htm
(Oct. 6, 1999) (describing the proposed rule change concerning corporate-governance-
listing standards).
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hancing the accountability, integrity and transparency of the Ex-
change's listed companies," and, in June 2002, a committee of the
NYSE issued a report on possible changes to the NYSE listing
standards.'" This report had a variety of recommendations that
went beyond Sarbanes-Oxley, including the following: "[requiring]
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors,"
with a stringent definition of the term "independent";45 mandat-
ing "regularly scheduled executive sessions" of boards chaired by
a lead director or independent chairman;'" "[requiring] listed
companies to have [nominating and compensation committees]
composed entirely of independent directors"; 47 and requiring that
"[shareholders ... be given the opportunity to vote on all equity-
compensation plans.""8 Several of these recommendations were
then filed with the SEC as proposed new listing standards.""
Among the NYSE proposals were listing requirements to the ef-
fect that "non-management directors ... must meet at regularly
scheduled executive sessions" and that nominating and compen-
sation committees be "composed entirely of independent direc-
tors.""5 NASDAQ filed similar, although slightly different, listing
proposals with the SEC.'51
Sarbanes-Oxley gave the SEC the authority it had long
wanted to restructure corporate audit committees, but it did so
primarily by authorizing the SEC to direct SROs to change their
listing rules to meet certain standards.52 Also, Sarbanes-Oxley
gave the SEC a mandate to require a public company to disclose
144. NYSE, Report of the New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and List-
ing Standards Committee 1, http'/www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govtreport.pdf (June 6, 2002)
[hereinafter NYSE Corporate Accountability Report].
145. Id. at 6-8.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 9-11.
148. Id. at 17-18.
149. Supra n. 137 and accompanying text (providing some of the proposals).
150. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051, 19051-19053 (Apr. 17, 2003).
151. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating
to Proposed Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding Board Independence
and Independent Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 14451 (Mar. 25, 2003) (containing similar pro-
posals concerning the independence of directors serving on audit committees and the pro-
posal that they be present for executive sessions).
152. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 775-777 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f).
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whether its audit committee includes at least one "financial ex-
pert.""' The SROs' regulation of public-company audit committees
and the substantive standards articulated in Sarbanes-Oxley
were not significant departures from previous listing standards,
but the statute did take authority away from management and
place it with the audit committee. The specific grant of authority
to the SEC to regulate the structure and duties of audit commit-
tees was a radical departure from previous legal theories regard-
ing the divide between federal and state law. Further, this grant
of authority embraced restructuring the audit committees of
listed foreign issuers.
There are a number of important ways in which Sarbanes-
Oxley altered the structure and work of audit committees. Each
audit committee member of a listed issuer must be "independent,"
meaning that an audit committee member "may not, other than in
his or her capacity as a [committee] member ... accept any con-
sulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer," or
"be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.""
"The audit committee... shall be directly responsible for the ap-
pointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any regis-
tered public accounting firm employed by that issuer." "
[Aludit committee[s] [must] establish procedures for ... [re-
ceiving, retaining, and treating] complaints . . . regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters;
and ... the confidential, anonymous submission by employees
... regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters. 56
The "audit committee [must] have the authority to engage inde-
pendent counsel and other advis[o]rs," and it must be adequately
153. Id. at § 407, 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 790.
154. Id. at § 301(mX3XB), 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 776 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f). This
definition of independence is more stringent than prior definitions utilized for listed com-
pany audit committees. Supra n. 139 (discussing a less stringent definition of independ-
ence); see ALI, supra n. 138, at § 1.34 (providing that a director who has a significant rela-
tionship will be deemed disinterested). However, the concept of an independent director is
a fluid one and is difficult to encapsulate in a legislative definition. See e.g. In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that "independence"
requires an objective examination of whether the director can make decisions based solely
on the corporation's best interests).
155. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 776 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f).
156. Id.
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funded. 5 7 Although the SROs, rather than the SEC, are to imple-
ment all of these requirements, the SROs have authority only to
go beyond, not to derogate from, these minimum standards." The
SEC is directed to adopt rules requiring a public company to dis-
close whether its audit committee includes at least one person
who is a "financial expert.""
The application of the audit-committee-restructuring provi-
sions to foreign issuers created a furor. That statute contained a
very limited exemption for foreign-government securities and for-
eign private issuers that have a board of independent auditors
separate from the board of directors."8 However, the creation of
an independent audit committee is a "revolutionary reform" for
corporations incorporated under civil-law regimes, because the
two-tier board structure does not have independent directors on
either the executive or managing board, and representatives of
employees compose half of the supervisory board.""' The rules that
the SEC proposed to implement the audit-committee-composition
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley made some concessions to foreign
issuers."2 Exceptions were proposed relating to corporations with
mandated employee representation on boards of directors, control-
ling and foreign-government shareholders, and boards with statu-
tory auditors.'" Some commenters on this proposal called for a
wholesale exemption for foreign issuers based on comity.' Others
called for flexibility and the pursuit of international convergence
on corporate-governance standards." A number of commenters
157. Id.
158. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1518.
159. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 407, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 790.
160. 15 U.S.C. at § 78j-1(mX3)(C).
161. Coffee, supra n. 77, at 1825.
162. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 2638,
2647-2648 (Jan. 17, 2003).
163. Id.
164. E.g. Comments from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to Jonathan Katz, Sec.,
SEC, File No. S7-02-03-Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees (Feb.
18, 2003) (available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/clearygotl/htm) (request-
ing additional flexibility for foreign private issuers); Comments from Alexander Schaub,
Dir. Gen., EC, to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed Rule: Standards Relating to Listed
Company Audit Committees (Feb. 18, 2003) (available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s702O3/aschaubl.htm) (requesting a general exemption for EU companies with
equivalent governance requirements).
165. Id.; see also Comments from Davis Polk & Wardwell, to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC,
File No. S7-02-03-Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees (Feb. 18,
2003) (available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/davispolkl.htm) (suggesting
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found the exemption for statutory auditors insufficient to
accommodate home-country practices.'"
The adopting release for the SEC rule implementing the au-
dit-composition requirements contained enlarged exemptions for
foreign issuers, 167 in recognition of the two-tier board structures of
Germany and some other countries,"6 and the requirements in
Japan, Italy, and some other countries for statutory boards of
auditors. 69 The SEC's rationale was that, in those countries, there
was a mechanism, other than the audit committee, to serve as a
counterweight to management with respect to the accuracy of au-
dited accounts. 7 ° Even though some foreign issuers might decide
not to list on a U.S. exchange under the new standards, 7 ' and the
corporate governance structures of many foreign companies are
significantly different than the structure of U.S. companies, the
that the rule be more flexible to the "evolving standards of corporate governance" and
"permit additional exemptions for foreign private issuers"); Comments from David Devlin,
Pres., F6dration des Experts Compatables Europ6ens, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec., SEC,
SEC Proposed Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, File No. S7-
02-03 (Dec. 20, 2002) (available at http:/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/ddevlin1.htm)
(commenting on the organization's "support [of the] international convergence of standards
to enhance global confidence in auditing").
166. See Comments from Baker & McKenzie, to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed
Rules for Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees (File No. S7-02-03)
Regarding Ukraine (Feb. 18, 2003) (available at http//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70203/bakerl.htm) (suggesting revisions to Rule 10-A so the exemption would be avail-
able to Ukrainian issuers); Comments from Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra n. 165 (suggest-
ing modification "for consistency with a broader range of home country laws"); Comments
from Hiroshi Endo, Dir., Nippon Keidanren (Japan Bus. Fedn.), to Jonathan Katz, Sec.,
SEC, Comments on the Proposed Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees (File. No. S7-02-03) (Feb. 18, 2003) (available at httpY/www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s70203/hendol.htm) (offering modifications t, increase exemptions and to ensure
that Japanese issuers could fit into the exemption); Comments from Stefano Micossi, Ital-
ian Assn. of Ltd. Liab. Cos., to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Standards Relating to Listed
Company Audit Committees-Proposed Rule in Release Nos. 33-8173; 34-47137; IC-25885;
File No. S7-02-03 (Feb. 18, 2003) (available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s702O3/
smicossil.htm) (arguing for accommodation with "evolving corporate governance rules and
practices of other countries").
167. 17 C.F.R. at § 240.10A-3.
168. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788,
18802 (Apr. 16, 2003).
169. Id. at 18803 n. 160.
170. Id. at 18802.
171. See Craig Karmin, World Stock Markets: Foreign Firms Lose Urge to Sell Stock in
U.S., Wall St. J. C1 (July 24, 2003) (available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3975005) (noting a reduc-
tion in foreign listings, in which analysts have blamed Sarbanes-Oxley).
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SEC declined to apply a general mutual-recognition standard to
the requirement for audit committee composition.'72
In the final rule defining a "financial expert" for the audit
committee, the SEC came up with a new term-"audit committee
financial expert."' Additionally, the SEC required reporting com-
panies, in their annual reports, to disclose whether they have at
least one such expert, and if they do not have an audit committee
financial expert, they must provide an explanation.74 Such an
expert must possess the following characteristics:
(i) An understanding of [GAAP] and financial state-
ments;
(ii) The ability to assess the general application of
[GAAP] in connection with the accounting for esti-
mates, accruals and reserves;
(iii) Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or eval-
uating financial statements that ... are generally
comparable to ... the registrant's financial state-
ments... ;
(iv) An understanding of internal controls and procedures
for financial reporting; and
(v) An understanding of audit committee functions. 7
5
In its final rule, the SEC recognized that such an individual
could have acquired his or her qualifications for becoming an au-
dit committee financial expert through "[elducation and experi-
ence as a principal financial officer" or auditor, experience super-
vising or "assessing the performance of companies," experience as
a public accountant or through "[oither relevant experience. " "'
The SEC also created a safe-harbor provision for audit committee
financial experts to the effect that such a designation "does not
impose ... any duties, obligations or [liabilities] that are greater
than the duties, obligations [or liabilities] imposed such a person"
would have as an audit committee member.' 77 The only relief
172. 68 Fed. Reg. at 18802.
173. 17 C.F.R. at § 229.401(h)(1).
174. Id. For an explanation of the disclosure requirements, consult 68 Fed. Reg. at
5110; Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 15353, 15353 (Mar. 31, 2003).
175. 17 C.F.R. at § 229.401(h)(2).
176. Id. at § 229.401(hX3).
177. Id. at § 229.401(hX4Xii).
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given to foreign issuers was that, in determining whether some-
one is an audit committee financial expert, the understanding of
GAAP need not be U.S. GAAP, but can be the GAAP that the is-
suer uses to prepare its primary financial statements.78
G. Regulation of Accountants
The creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB)-a new federal watchdog for the regulation of the
public accounting profession-is at the heart of the reforms em-
bodied in Sarbanes-Oxley, 79 but this new framework affects cor-
porate governance only indirectly. The use of the PCAOB to ob-
tain leverage over foreign accountants has proven very controver-
sial. In Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC obtained the power it long
sought to formulate auditing standards and to discipline account-
ants for improper professional conduct."s The PCAOB's responsi-
bilities include the following: the registration and inspection of all
"public accounting firms that prepare audit reports" for public
companies; the adoption and modification of "auditing, quality
control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports" for public company audits; the in-
vestigation of registered firms for violations of rules relating to
audits; and the imposition of sanctions for such violations."' This
federalization of the regulation of auditing standards is signifi-
cant. In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley did not exempt foreign auditors
from its provisions. The PCAOB-as one of Sarbanes-Oxley's first
acts after its formation ' 2 -proposed a rule requiring the registra-
tion of foreign auditors for SEC registered and reporting compa-
nies." This caused great consternation abroad and has been pro-
tested vigorously."' The Sarbanes-Oxley's legislative history sug-
178. Id. at Instr. 3 to Item 401(h). Also, foreign issuers have until July 31, 2005, to
comply with this new rule. 68 Fed. Reg. at 18788.
179. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 101, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 750.
180. Id. at § 101(a), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 750.
181. Id. at § 101(c), 2002 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 750.
182. The SEC has approved the PCAOB as an appropriate organization under Sar-
banes-Oxley. Order Regarding Section 101(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 23336, 23336 (May 1, 2003).
183. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules
Relating to Registration System, 68 Fed. Reg. 35016, 35020 (June 11, 2003).
184. See David S. Hilzenrath, Foreign Firms Wary of SEC Rules; Business Regulators
from Abroad Urge Exemptions, Wash. Post E04 (Dec. 18, 2002) (available at 2002 WL
104307027) (reporting that representatives of certain global accounting firms urged the
2004]
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gests, however, that Congress meant to subject foreign auditors of
companies that sell shares to U.S. investors to the jurisdiction of
the PCAOB.'" Further, the SEC seems intent upon having the
right to obtain documents from foreign auditors that may be privi-
leged in their jurisdictions.186
Sarbanes-Oxley also has a number of auditor-independence
provisions that affect not only auditors, but also audit committees
and executives and directors of public companies."17 Most of these
provisions were a response to egregious conflicts of interest at
Enron and other failed companies, which the SEC was unable to
abolish previously.' Under Sarbanes-Oxley, an auditor for an
issuer is prohibited from providing a list of non-audit services,
including the following:
(1) bookkeeping...;
(2) financial information systems design and implemen-
tation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or
contribution-in-kind reports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal audit outsourcing services;
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment advisor, or investment
banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the
audit; and
SEC to offer relief from the rules to foreign countries); Foreign Legislation Seen Hindering
PCAOB Oversight of Foreign Auditors, 9 World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 15 (Apr. 2003) [herein-
after Foreign Legislation] (providing examples of the negative reaction abroad); PCAOB
Proposes Rules on Investigation, Inspection; Progress Seen on Foreign Front, 35 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1306 (Aug. 4, 2003) (discussing the negative reaction overseas).
185. Sen. Rpt. 107-205 at 11 (July 3, 2002).
186. See Carrie Johnson, Accounting Panel, SEC Backs Registry for Foreign Auditors,
Wash. Post E01 (Apr. 1, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 17424865) (reporting that foreign
auditors have lobbied for exemption); Carrie Johnson, Deloitte Probe to Test Reach of U.S.
Laws; SEC Plans to Subpoena Ahold's Foreign Auditor, Wash. Post E01 (Feb. 28, 2003)
(available at 2003 WL 13335507) (referencing Sarbanes-Oxley, which allowed SEC lawyers
to subpoena audit papers from foreign offices of big U.S. accounting firms). Data privacy
and confidentiality laws in some foreign countries may be a serious barrier to giving work
papers to the SEC. Foreign Legislation, supra n. 184, at 15.
187. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at §§ 201-209, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 771-775.
188. Hilzenrath, supra n. 184, at E04.
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(9) any other service that the [PCAOB] determines, by
regulation, is impermissible. 89
Further, the issuer's audit committee must pre-approve all
services that an auditor provides."9° The SEC's rule implementing
this provision requires disclosures designed to give investors an
understanding of how the audit committee is managing the com-
pany's relationship with its auditor.'91 Other provisions of Sar-
banes-Oxley require rotation of an audit partner every five
years"' and direct the SEC to study the possible mandatory rota-
tion of audit firms.'93 A conflict-of-interest provision prohibits
anyone who was employed by an auditor for an issuer within a
one-year period from becoming the "[CEO], controller, [CFO], or
chief accounting officer" of the issuer. 1" These auditor-
independence requirements affect foreign issuers and their audi-
tors. While the SEC has made some very limited accommodations
for foreign auditors, it has applied the auditor independence and
rotation rules to them generally.'95
H. Regulation of Attorneys
The Sarbanes-Oxley provision giving the SEC authority to
regulate attorneys is another big topic that is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it also impacts corporate governance indirectly
and has implications for foreign lawyers. Further, it federalizes
189. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 201(g), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 771-772 (amending 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1).
190. Id. at § 202, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 772 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I).
191. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6027-6028 (Feb. 5, 2003).
192. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 203(j), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 773 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1). This could result in a problem at some foreign locations where there are not a
large number of audit partners with expertise in a particular industry, but the only relief
given to foreign issuers in the SEC's implementing rules was transition relief. 68 Fed. Reg.
at 6021-6022.
193. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 207, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 775. Now that there are only
four big firms, thanks to the Justice Department's decision to close down Arthur Anderson,
such a system would accomplish little. The GAO was instructed to study the concentration
within the accounting profession. Id. at § 701, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 797.
194. Id. at § 206, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 774-775 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
195. See Ethiopis Tafara, Acting Dir., OIA, SEC, Speech, Addressing International
Concerns under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Luxembourg, June 10, 2003) (available at
http'J/www.sec.gov/news/speeclhspch061003et.htm) (reporting that, although the SEC has
made accommodations for foreign issuers, it intends to insist upon the independence of
foreign auditors).
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an area of the law in which the SEC's reach has long exceeded its
grasp and which has been extremely controversial. The furor over
the SEC's proposed rulemaking to implement Sarbanes-Oxley
with respect to lawyers indicates that this controversy will con-
tinue.
In Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC finally achieved legislative bless-
ing for its ability to bring administrative actions against both at-
torneys and accountants and to censure, suspend, or bar any per-
son from "appearing or practicing before the Commission."'" Fur-
ther, Sarbanes-Oxley defines "improper professional conduct" as
"intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct" and
"highly unreasonable [negligent] conduct" or "repeated instances
of unreasonable [negligent] conduct."97 Setting forth this stan-
dard settled a controversy as to whether the SEC had the author-
ity to sanction auditors for negligent conduct.18
In addition to giving the SEC the power to bring malpractice
cases against attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC, "[niot
later than 180 days after the enactment of [the] Act ... [to] issue
rules.., setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct
for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission
... in the representation of issuers."'" Such rules include "requir-
ing an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of secu-
rities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the
[CEO]."' Further, "if the counsel or officer does not appropriately
respond to the evidence," the attorney must "report the evidence
to the audit committee of the board ... or to another committee
... comprised solely of [independent] directors," or to the full
196. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 602, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 794 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78a
et seq.). The grounds for such disciplinary sanctions are as follows:
(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others;
(2) to be lacking in character or integrity, or to have engaged in unethical or im-
proper professional conduct; or
(3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of, any
provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations issued thereunder.
Id.
197. Id.
198. See Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, "Doj& Vu All over Again7: The Securities
and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting Profession
through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 553, 575-600 (discussing
the issue of whether the SEC has the ability to impose sanctions).
199. Pub. L. No. 107-204 at § 307, 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. at 784.
200. Id.
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board.20' Although this "up the ladder" reporting of law violations
was a permitted practice in most state ethics rules applicable to
attorneys, the American Bar Association (ABA) rules did not go
quite as far and did not permit a lawyer to disclose confidential
information to a third party.'
The SEC rulemaking proposal to implement the Sarbanes-
Oxley provisions regarding attorneys' professional responsibilities
went far beyond the statutory provisions. It required that any
attorney, who "report[s] evidence of a material violation of [the]
securities laws or breach of [a] fiduciary duty" and is not satisfied
that the chief legal officer or CEO has responded appropriately,
must make a "noisy withdrawal" from continued representation of
the corporation-that is, the attorney must resign from the en-
gagement and notify the SEC.' ° The SEC proposed an alternative
that issuers could form a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee
(QLCC), which would have the responsibility of notifying the SEC
of an attorney's withdrawal.' This proposal was an attempt to
hold corporate attorneys responsible for documenting their cli-
ents' violations of the law and then reporting those violations to a
government prosecutor. 2 5 This was a return to the much discred-
ited and ultimately abandoned whistleblower theory of SEC v.
201. Id. Senator John Edwards sponsored Section 307 and tried to make clear that a
lawyer for a public corporation represents the corporation and its shareholders, and not
the corporate officers. See 107 Cong. Rec. S6551-S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (discuss-
ing the fact that attorneys are required to report evidence to the audit committee if the
counsel or officer does not deal with the situation properly).
202 See generally Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson's Choice for Securities Lawyers in the
Post-Enron Environment: Striking a Balance between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and
Market Gatekeeper, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 91 (2002) (reporting that most states have
adopted standards of confidentiality that are broader than what the ABA permits); Roger
C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58
Bus. Law. 143, 157 (2002) (stating that the majority of states have not adopted the ABA's
narrow rules). In fact, the origin of Section 307 seems to have been the idea of six legal
ethics professors who were in disagreement with the ABA. See Richard W. Painter, Panel
Remarks, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney after the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Wash., D.C., Nov. 22, 2002), in 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 613, 615-620
(2002) (providing Professor Painter's remarks on Section 307). In August 2003, the ABA
amended its model ethics rules to permit "up the ladder" reporting and outside disclosure.
Greg Pease, ABA Amends Model Ethics Rules to Permit up the Ladder Reports of Corporate
Wrongs, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1358 (Aug. 18, 2003).
203. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71670, 71673 (Dec. 2, 2002).
204. Id. at 71674.
205. Id.
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National Student Marketing Corp.,' which no court ever ac-
cepted. The SEC further proposed to determine any questions of
attorney-client privilege involved in whistleblowing and to pre-
empt any state-law rules preventing such conduct. 7 The proposed
rule would have applied to any breach of fiduciary duty recog-
nized at common law, as Sarbanes-Oxley contains the phrase
"breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation" in describing the
types of problems that must be reported "up the ladder."'
Whether Congress' hastily drafted words were meant to overturn
Supreme Court caselaw, drawing a distinction between the fed-
eral securities laws and state corporation laws concerning fiduci-
ary duty, is an interesting question.
After a comment-letter process in which there were a multi-
tude of negative comments, the SEC cut back on its proposal and
eliminated the "noisy withdrawal" provisions.' Nevertheless, in a
newly proposed rule, the SEC floated the idea of requiring public
companies to file a report with regard to any resignation by an
attorney dissatisfied with a corporate counsel or CEO reaction to
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fidu-
ciary duty.21 Although this story relates primarily to the federali-
zation of the regulation of attorneys, it clearly affects corporate
governance.
The SEC's proposed rule on attorney obligations drew no dis-
tinction between U.S. and foreign attorneys. The SEC then held a
Roundtable on December 17, 2002, to discuss the proposed rule's
international impact, at which strong objections to its application
to foreign attorneys were voiced. 21' Further, more than forty com-
ment letters addressed the international aspects of the rule.1 2 In
206. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
207. 67 Fed. Reg. at 71674.
208. Id.
209. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6306 (Feb. 6, 2003).
210. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6324, 6329 (Feb. 6, 2003).
211. 68 Fed. Reg. at 6314.
212. Id. Foreign bar associations and others objected to the SEC's proposal on many
grounds, including that the SEC had no right to discipline foreign lawyers; that the pro-
posed rules would require foreign attorneys to interpret U.S. law, which would be unrea-
sonable and inappropriate; that the conflict between foreign attorney-client-privilege rules
in foreign jurisdictions would conflict with the "noisy withdrawal" proposal; and that the
proposed rules could extend coverage to nonlawyers' and lawyers' work product without
knowledge of the incorporation of such documents' contents into SEC filings. See e.g.
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its final rule, the SEC defined an "attorney" to include "any per-
son who is admitted, licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice
law in any [foreign or domestic] jurisdiction." 213 It included an ex-
ception for a "non-appearing foreign attorney," meaning,
an attorney ... admitted to practice law ... outside the [U.S.]
... [wiho does not hold himself or herself out as practicing, and
does not give legal advice regarding [U.S. law], ... [and con-
ducts] activities that would constitute appearing and practicing
before the [SEC] only incidentally to ... the practice of law in a
Comments from Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307-Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for At-
torneys-Part 205 (File No. 33-8150.wp) (Dec. 18, 2002) (available at http'//www
.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502jfcalderonl.htm) (expressing a general desire to retain the
Mexican Bar's sole authority to discipline Mexican lawyers); Comments from Dr. Domek,
Pres., German Fed. B., to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed Rule: Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Dec. 17, 2002) (available at
http:J/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502tdombekl.htm) (urging the SEC to exempt for-
eign lawyers-i.e., German lawyers-from the proposed rules); Comments from Tohru
Motobayashi, Pres., Japan Fedn. of B. Assns., to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed Rule:
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Release Nos. 33-8186;
34-47282; IC-25920) (Mar. 31, 2003) (available at http'/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/tmotobayashi1.htm) (stating that the "noisy withdrawal" proposal will encroach
upon Japanese attorneys' duty of confidentiality); Comments from Ronald F. Pl, Pres.,
Corp. Lawyers' Assn. of New Zealand, and Peter Turner, CEO & Gen. Counsel, Australian
Corp. Lawyers Assn., to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Implementation of Standards of Con-
duct for Attorneys (Dec. 18, 2002) (available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
rf'poll.htm) (voicing concerns that the proposed rules would be a "trap" for the unknowing
attorney, would restrict the effectiveness of legal counsel, and would have a negative im-
pact on business development); Comments from Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen., EC, to Jona-
than Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys (Dec. 13, 2002) (available at http'J/www.sec.gov/rulestproposed/s74502/
aschaubl.htm) (observing European legal preemption of a "noisy withdrawal" and a per-
ception that "reporting up the ladder" places an undue burden on European lawyers);
Comments from Swiss Bankers Assn., to Jonathan Katz, Sec., SEC, Proposed Rule on
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys; Release Nos. 33-8150;
34-46868; IC-25829; File No. S7-45-02 (Dec. 18, 2002) (available at http'J/www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502luprothl.htm) (emphasizing a conflict between the SEC's proposed
rules and the Swiss confidentiality law); Comments from 77 Law Firms, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec., SEC, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307-Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys-Part 205 (File No. 33-8150.wp) (Dec. 18, 2002) (available at
httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirmsl.htm) (addressing concerns that the
proposed rules had conflicting interpretations, contradicted Sarbanes-Oxley's legislative
history, and exceeded the scope of the SEC's power under Sarbanes-Oxley); see also Rachel
McTague, Foreign Lawyers Raise Concerns about Reporting Rule Proposed by SEC, 34 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2040 (Dec. 23, 2002) (discussing concerns of foreign lawyers).
213. 17 C.F.R. at § 205.2(c).
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[foreign] jurisdiction ... or ... only in consultation with [U.S.]
counsel." 4
Whether this accommodation for foreign attorneys will satisfy
the very critical comments received on the SEC's proposed rule
will probably depend on how the SEC interprets its rule. Further,
the SEC's pending proposal to compel issuers to report attorney
resignations in their SEC filings, in lieu of a mandated "noisy
withdrawal" rule, would be applicable to foreign issuers."5
I. Added SRO Requirements
In June 2002, a NYSE committee issued a report recommend-
ing changes to the NYSE listing standards.2"6 This report had a
variety of recommendations for changes in NYSE listing stan-
dards that went beyond Sarbanes-Oxley, including the following:
"[requiring] listed companies to have a majority of independent
directors," with a stringent definition of the term "independent";2 7
mandating "regularly scheduled executive sessions" of boards
chaired by a lead director or independent chairman;218 "[requiring]
listed companies to have [nominating and compensation commit-
tees] composed entirely of independent directors";2"' requiring that
"shareholders ... be given the opportunity to vote on all equity-
compensation plans";' and "[requiring] listed foreign private is-
suers to disclose any significant ways in which their corporate
governance practices differ from those followed by domestic com-
panies under NYSE listing standards.""' These recommendations
were then transmitted to the NYSE Board of Directors, and sev-
eral of them have been filed with the SEC as proposed new listing
standards.
In addition to proposals that relate to audit committees, the
NYSE has proposed that "non-management directors ... must
meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions," and that nomi-
214. Id. at § 205.2(j).
215. 68 Fed. Reg. at 6331.
216. NYSE Corporate Accountability Report, supra n. 144. SEC Chairman Pitt re-
quested this project to review the SEC's corporate-governance-listings standard. Id. at 1.
217. Id. at 6-8.
218 Id. at 8.
219. Id. at 9.
220. Id. at 17.
221. Id. at 22.
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nating and compensation committees be "composed entirely of
independent directors."' However, with regard to such changes
that Sarbanes-Oxley did not mandate, listed foreign issuers need
only "disclose any significant ways in which their corporate gov-
ernance practices differ from those followed by domestic compa-
nies under NYSE listing standards," either on their web sites or
in their annual reports.' NASDAQ filed similar, although
slightly different, listing proposals with the SEC.' Further, the
SEC's approval of the new listing requirement, proposed by both
the NYSE and NASDAQ, that "shareholders ... be given the op-
portunity to vote on all equity-compensation plans," does not ap-
ply to plans covering employees residing in non-U.S. jurisdic-
tions .7
Even more dramatic governance reforms may be forthcoming.
In mid-July 2003, the SEC issued an extensive report recom-
mending changes in the regulations governing the director-
selection process, with a view toward giving shareholders greater
participation in this process." However, it is unlikely that any
reforms resulting from these recommendations will impact for-
eign issuers directly because they are not subject to the proxy
rules.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Very generally, the SEC has implemented the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act by imposing new disclosure requirements on foreign
issuers and accommodating them, to a limited extent, in the im-
plementation of regulatory corporate-governance standards. Nev-
ertheless, many of the new disclosure obligations affect corporate
governance, and the accommodations made with regard to board
composition and structure and the regulation of foreign auditors
222. 68 Fed. Reg. at 19053-19054.
223. Id. at 19058.
224. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14451.
225. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule
Changes and Nasdaq Amendment No. 1 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Acceler-
ated Approval to NYSE Amendments No. 1 and 2 and Nasdaq Amendments No. 2 and 3
Thereto Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, 68 Fed. Reg. 39995, 39997, 40003 (July 3,
2003).
226. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the
Nomination and Election of Directors, http'//www.sec.gov/news/ studieslproxyrpt.htm (July
15, 2003).
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and attorneys may not go far enough to alleviate the problems
and concerns of foreign issuers. The reaction of foreign issuers to
Sarbanes-Oxley will be significant to the SEC's administration of
the statute and its new rules because approximately ten percent
of SEC registrants are foreign issuers, representing twenty per-
cent of all registered issuers by capitalization.22 '7 Yet, the existence
of this significant and growing group of registered companies
makes it difficult for the SEC to make exceptions for foreign issu-
ers that are not made for U.S. issuers.
Among the possible effects of the application of Sarbanes-
Oxley to foreign issuers are two diametrically opposed scenarios.
On the one hand, foreign issuer registrations and listings in the
U.S. could decline significantly, to the detriment of the markets in
New York and to the benefit of markets abroad, particularly Lon-
don. On the other hand, worldwide corporate-governance stan-
dards could change so that U.S. standards and standards else-
where become harmonized. Although it is difficult to predict what
the actual results of Sarbanes-Oxley will be, the attitude of the
SEC staff and the SEC's policies in enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley and
refining the rules adopted under the statute could make a differ-
ence. If the SEC embarks upon a unilateralist policy of insisting
that all foreign issuers rise to a U.S. standard, diminished activ-
ity by foreign investors in the U.S. can be anticipated. The SEC
frequently presumes that U.S. standards are superior to stan-
dards abroad-an attitude that is greatly resented overseas. In
fact, although there have been plenty of scandals regarding non-
U.S. companies, the U.S. scandals of the past few years are hardly
an advertisement for the superiority of U.S. corporate-governance
standards. If the SEC returns to a more internationalist ap-
proach, it can be anticipated that corporate-governance standards
everywhere will adapt to the Sarbanes-Oxley regime and the
strength of the U.S. markets will continue to attract foreign is-
suer listings. The SEC may also attempt to sidestep the problems
of applying Sarbanes-Oxley to foreign issuers by fashioning fur-
ther exemptions from registration for large institutional inves-
tors.28
227. Cunningham, supra n. 99, at 896.
228. Such an approach could be fashioned by permitting foreign exchange screens in
the U.S. for the exclusive use of institutional investors. File No. S7-16-97 Regulation of
Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. 30485, 30529 (June 4, 1997).
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The scanty evidence available suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley
may have placed a damper on foreign issuers' enthusiasm for U.S.
listings. "Germany's Porsche and Japan's Daiwa Securities Group
and Fuji Photo Film announced they would delay planned U.S.
stock listings, citing confusion over the regulatory environ-
ment. " m But other circumstances, such as the aftermath of the
accounting scandals in the U.S., the weak global economy, and
generally poor stock markets worldwide, could also be factors in
decisions not to come to the U.S. markets. 230 In its comment letter
of February 2003, regarding the SEC's proposed audit-committee
standards, the NYSE observed that several foreign listed compa-
nies were considering delisting from the NYSE or the SEC, and
that one company had elected to list in London instead of New
York because of Sarbanes-Oxley. 1 However, delisting is very dif-
ficult,232 so any adverse impact on U.S. listings is likely to be pro-
spective.
Although foreign issuers have objected strenuously to the
SEC's rulemaking pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley becoming applica-
ble to them, and some foreign regulators have joined in these ob-
jections,' foreign regulators are beginning to put in place their
own corporate governance reforms in response to the scandals in
the capital markets and Sarbanes-Oxley. Very generally, the
European approach to corporate governance is one of self-
regulation by corporate governance codes; public companies then
229. Karmin, supra n. 171, at C1.
230. Id.
231. See Comments from Darla C. Stuckey, Corp. Sec., NYSE, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Sec., SEC, Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees (Feb. 21,
2003) (available at http'/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/dcstuckeyl.htm) (encourag-
ing support for a previous suggestion that the SEC should avoid making its rules too spe-
cific and should let companies enforce the rules upon themselves).
232. Perino, supra n. 86, at 242-244. The NYSE has proposed a liberalization of its
Rule 500, which has made it difficult to delist from the Exchange, but can be accomplished
by a vote from a listed company's board of directors. Floyd Norris, Big Board to Eliminate
Rule on Moving to Another Market, N.Y. Times C6 (Aug. 8, 2003) (available at LEXIS,
News library, NYT file). To exit from the SEC disclosure system, however, a foreign issuer
must certify that it has
securities ... held of record by ... M1ess than 300 persons resident in the [U.S.] or
... [less than 500 persons resident in the [U.S.] where the total assets of the issuer
have not exceeded $10 million on the last day of each of the issuer's most recent
three fiscal years.
17 C.F.R. at § 2 40.12g-4.
233. Commission Threatens Retaliation over U.S. Auditor Registration Rules, 9 World
Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 10 (May 2003).
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disclose whether or not they are in compliance with such codes.'
Because of the different corporate-finance structures in different
European countries, these codes differ from country to country,
but many of them have been the subject of reform efforts in recent
years. " The Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Reports in the
U.K., the Vienot Report in France, and the Peters Report in the
Netherlands have all focused on issues such as the role of the
CEO, independent directors, audit committees, and management
remuneration."3 The OECD has promulgated principles for corpo-
rate governance that have been a prod to reform with respect to
shareholder rights and board functions."7
In May 2003, the European Commission presented an action
plan for enhancing corporate governance and modernizing com-
pany law to strengthen shareholder rights and to help restore in-
vestor confidence in capital markets." This plan embodied the
Commission's response to a report that the High Level Group of
Company Law Experts presented in November 2002." Among
other things, the Commission's Action Plan set forth the following
initiatives: requiring "an Annual Corporate Governance State-
ment" by listed companies; "promoting the role of (independent)
non-executive or supervisory directors"; including the "[mlinimum
standards on the creation, composition and role of the nomina-
tion, remuneration and audit committees [to] be defined at EU
level and enforced by Member States"; making directors' remu-
neration more transparent; and developing a legislative frame-
234. Special Study Group, supra n. 3, at 1549.
235. See Karel Lannoo, A European Perspective on Corporate Governance, 37 J. Com.
Mark. Studs. 269 (June 1999) (discussing the various codes and reform efforts); Holly J.
Gregory & Robert T. Simmelkjaer II, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes
Relevant to the European Union and its Member States, httpY/europa.eu.int/comm/
internaLmarketen/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt-partl en.pdf (Jan. 2002)
(providing a comprehensive overview of relevant codes).
236. Id. at tbl. 5.
237. OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, http'//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
47/50/434764.pdf (May 1999).
238. Europa, Internal Market, Modernising European Company Law, httpj/www
.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm (accessed
Sept. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Modernising European Company Law].
239. Id.; Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regula-
tory Framework for Company Law in Europe, httpJ/www.europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/en/company/company/modern/consult/report-en.pdf (Nov. 4, 2002) [here-
inafter Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts].
[Vol. XXXIII
Corporate Governance
work for shareholder rights." ° This proposal did not involve a
formal European Corporate Governance Code because, in the
view of the Commission, this "would simply add an additional
layer between international principles and national codes.""4 This
initiative is clearly a response to Sarbanes-Oxley; however, it is
designed to bring EU companies up to an international standard
that will be respectful of European legal and cultural differences
in corporate governance. Another initiative to improve the audit-
ing of company accounts was a Commission recommendation set-
ting minimum quality-assurance standards for statutory audits. 2
EU press releases issued in connection with these proposals
are interesting because they attempt to put the EU in a position
of being cooperative and competitive, yet resistant to the SEC in
its extraterritorial application of Sarbanes-Oxley.243 When intro-
ducing the Commission's Action Plan,
Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said: "Com-
pany law and corporate governance are right at the heart of
the political agenda, on both sides of the Atlantic. That's be-
cause economies only work if companies are run efficiently and
transparently.... The Commission is shouldering its responsi-
bilities: Corporate Europe must shape up and do the same.
Working in partnership, we have a unique opportunity to
strengthen European corporate governance and to be a model
for the rest of the world.' "
At the same time, in a question-and-answer press release
about the Action Plan, the Commission asserted that the Action
Plan is not an "admission that EU corporate governance is not
currently up to [U.S.] levels post Sarbanes-Oxley."
240. Modernising European Company Law, supra n. 238, at httpJ/www.europa.eu
.int/comm/internalmarket/en/company/company/modernfmdex.htm.
241. Id.
242. Commission Proposes Measures to Improve Auditing, Governance, 9 World Sec. L.
Rep. (BNA) 3 (June 2003).
243. Europa, EU Institutions Press Releases, Company Law and Corporate Governance:
Commission Presents Action Plan, http:/www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten
.kshp-action.gettxt=gt&doc+IP/03t716/O/R (May 21, 2003).
244. Id.
245. Europa, EU Institutions Press Releases, Commission Action Plan on "Modernising
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union'-
Frequently Asked Questions, http'/lwww.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgilguesten.ksh?p-action
.gettxt=gt&doc+MEMO/03/112 (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
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It is not helpful to look at this in terms of a race: neither side is
"ahead" of the other. Clearly a lot of work is being done and
will continue to be done on both sides of the Atlantic.
Unfortunately the [Sarbanes-OxleyJ Act creates a series of
problems due to its outreach effects on European companies
and auditors, and the Commission is engaged in an intense
regulatory dialogue with a view to negotiating acceptable solu-
tions with the... [SEC). '4
Similarly, in June 2003, Canadian securities regulators un-
veiled an initiative to restore investor confidence and to bring
Canada into line with U.S. standards with three corporate gov-
ernance rules on auditor oversight,2'7 certifications in companies'
reports, 8 and audit committees. 9 These proposals were put forth
as a response to the challenge of Sarbanes-Oxley." When the
rules were announced, the Chairman of the Ontario Securities
Commission stated, "The rules are robust as parallel rules re-
quired by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, but address unique Ca-
nadian concerns."2 '
These significant efforts to harmonize European and Cana-
dian law are likely to encourage other countries to propose similar
reforms and also to encourage the formulation of international
corporate-governance standards by such organizations as the
OECD and IOSCO.m Yet, significant differences between U.S.
and European norms persist and make harmonization and even-
tual mutual recognition difficult. For example, the High Level
Group of Company Law Experts recommended that the nomina-
246. Id.
247. Ontario Secs. Commn., Rules & Regulation, 52-108 Auditor Oversight,
http'/www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rulestrule-52-108_20030627_multi-
lateral-instrument.htm (June 27, 2003).
248. Ontario Secs. Commn., Rules & Regulation, 52-109 Certification of Disclosure
in Companies' Annual and Interim Filings, http:/www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/
Rulemaking/Rulestrule_52-109 20030627_multilateral-instrumenthtm (June 27, 2003).
249. Ontario Secs. Commn., Rules & Regulation, 52-110 Audit Com-
mittees, http'/www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rule/rue_52-110-20030627
_multilateral-instrument.htm (June 27, 2003).
250. Proposed Corporate Governance Rules Meant to Restore Investors' Confidence, 9
World Sec. Rep. (BNA) 3 (July 2003).
251. Id.
252. Lawrence I. Speer, International Developments: G-8 Leaders Reaffirm Earlier
Commitment to Better Governance, Accounting Standards, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
955 (June 9, 2003).
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tion and remuneration of listed companies' directors and the
board's supervision of the audit committee or similar body should
be decided exclusively by independent directors.' But the Com-
mission's Action Plan asserted that executive directors are best
placed to know the qualities needed for board appointments.2
Nevertheless, the Action Plan envisions the adoption of a recom-
mendation on directors' remuneration.' Further, there are still
two-tier boards in many European countries.' After Sarbanes-
Oxley, the most important difference between European and U.S.
corporate governance is that the U.S. has encapsulated generally
accepted good practice into federal law and SEC rules, rather
than self-regulatory codes.
It would appear that foreign issuers' reactions to Sarbanes-
Oxley will follow a familiar pattern-foreign issuers' vigorous pro-
test to being subjected to new SEC regulations, followed by for-
eign regulators' responsive actions to impose some of the same
new standards, likely to lead to accommodations by both the for-
eign issuer community and the SEC to a new regime. Despite the
hoopla surrounding the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, some have
questioned whether the Act accomplishes much more than put-
ting into law what was previously accepted as good corporate
practice." Nevertheless, the SEC has been given tools to reform
corporate governance practices that it did not have previously,
and this is a significant new federal power in the hands of an ac-
tivist agency. If the SEC's past predilections are an indication of
future policies, serious structural corporate governance reforms
will not be imposed upon foreign issuers. Alternatively, the grow-
ing number of foreign issuer registrants and international compe-
tition for investments and capital make it more difficult for the
SEC to impose stringent rules on U.S. companies and not on for-
eign companies. Whether the SEC will resolve this tension
through international cooperation or through a more unilateralist
approach is a question for the future.
253. Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, supra n. 239, at 60-62.
254. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 245, at http'/www.europa.ev.int/
rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc+MEMO/03/1 12.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heauy Rhetoric, Light Re-
form (and It Just Might Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 917-923 (2003).
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